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A FRESH LOOK AT TITLE VII: SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
DISCRIMINATION AS SEX DISCRIMINATION 
BY ANTHONY MICHAEL KREIS 
Anthony Michael Kreis is a visiting assistant professor of law at Chicago-Kent College of Law. Professor 
Kreis specializes in employment law and family law, with a focus on LGBT rights. He earned a Ph.D. 
from the University of Georgia, a J.D. from Washington and Lee, and a B.A. from the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 2006, the Illinois Human Rights Act has prohibited discrimination in 
employment because of an employee’s sexual orientation or gender identity.[1]  
Until 2017, employees discriminated against because of their sexual orientation 
had no federal cause of action, however. In a landmark decision, Hively v. Ivy 
Tech, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit became the first appellate court 
to hold that federal law’s prohibition of sex discrimination in the workplace also 
proscribed sexual orientation discrimination.[2] The Hively decision is a 
substantial departure from decades’ worth of Seventh Circuit precedent and 
created a split between the circuits. The Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Title 
VII may auger the future of sexual orientation discrimination claims under federal 
law. 
II. TITLE VII’S DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT FROM ULANE TO 
HIVELY 
The Seventh Circuit first addressed whether Title VII’s sex discrimination 
protections extended to employees adversely treated because of their sexual 
orientation in 1984. In that case, Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,[3]   the court was 
called on to determine Title VII’s scope where an airline pilot claimed she was 
unlawfully discriminated against because she was transgender.  The court ruled in 
Ulane that “homosexuals and transvestites do not enjoy Title VII protection.”[4]   
The panel reasoned that the ordinary meaning of sex did not also mean 
transgender or sexual orientation because “[t]he phrase in Title VII prohibiting 
discrimination based on sex, in its plain meaning, implies that it is unlawful to 
discriminate against women because they are women and against men because 
they are men.”[5]  The Ulane court further reasoned that the “dearth of legislative 
history” with respect to Congress’ inclusion of sex among Title VII’s protected 
classes “strongly reinforces the view that that section means nothing more than its 
plain language implies.”[6]   
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This view of Title VII’s narrow scope was reaffirmed by the Seventh Circuit in a 
1997 decision where the panel emphasized, “Congress had nothing more than the 
traditional notion of ‘sex’ in mind when it voted to outlaw sex discrimination, and 
that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and transsexualism, for 
example, did not fall within the purview of Title VII.”[7]   
In two subsequent cases decided in 2000, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that Title 
VII did not afford any protections to covered employees from sexual orientation 
discrimination.[8]  Relying on the dicta in Ulane, the panels in Hamner v. St. 
Vincent Hospital & Health Care Center and Spearman v. Ford Motor Company 
ruled that “harassment based solely upon a person's sexual preference or 
orientation (and not on one's sex) is not an unlawful employment practice under 
Title VII.”[9]  In decisions as late as 2014, the circuit precedent established in 
Ulane, Hamner, and Spearman that Title VII did not provide a remedy for sexual 
orientation discrimination was relied upon to block sexual orientation 
discrimination claims.[10]   
Numerous efforts to legislatively amend Title VII to overturn decisions like Ulane 
and expressly protect lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons from 
employment discrimination failed.[11]   However, in the years since Ulane, the 
Supreme Court began to transform Title VII’s sex discrimination doctrine. First, in 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court ruled that an employer’s use of 
gender expectations while making employment decisions can be an actionable 
form of employment discrimination.[12]   
Price Waterhouse did not produce a majority opinion. A plurality of the Court in 
Price Waterhouse reasoned that under Title VII “gender must be irrelevant to 
employment decisions” and that “[i]n the specific context of sex stereotyping, an 
employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or 
that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”[13]  Thus, employees who 
demonstrate gender nonconforming characteristics are protected under Title VII. 
As the Seventh Circuit ably summarized it, “Title VII does not permit an employee 
to be treated adversely because his or her appearance or conduct does not conform 
to stereotypical gender roles.”[14]  
In Price Waterhouse’s wake, effeminate gay men and masculine lesbians 
successfully brought sex discrimination claims as gender non-conformity 
claims.[15]  Courts were tasked with parsing out whether employees were truly 
discriminated against because of their sexual orientation or because they failed to 
live up to a sex stereotype. One recent example from the Second Circuit reveals the 
difficulty in this task. Matthew Christiansen brought a Title VII claim alleging that 
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he was impermissibly sex-stereotyped, which was dismissed because the district 
court determined his allegations stemmed more from his supervisor’s anti-gay 
animus than his supervisor’s gender role expectations.[16]  
In his complaint, Christiansen alleged that his supervisor called him “effeminate” 
around co-workers, described him as “prancing around,” and placed an image of 
his head on a female body with her legs in the air.[17]  Christiansen’s supervisor 
drew multiple lewd pictures of Christiansen, including one where Christiansen had 
an erect penis while holding an air pump with bubble caption that said, “I'm so 
pumped for marriage equality.”[18]  Christiansen also claimed that his supervisor 
said that because he was both gay and effeminate, he likely had AIDS. The message 
Christiansen’s supervisor communicated to his colleagues, as one coworker 
interpreted it, was that Christiansen was “a submissive sissy.”[19]   
The district court concluded that because Christiansen proffered more allegations 
tied to his sexual orientation than to his effeminate demeanor, his claim could not 
be “transform[ed] into a claim for discrimination that [Christiansen] plainly 
interpreted—and the facts support—as stemming from sexual orientation animus 
into one for sexual stereotyping.”[20]   The Second Circuit reversed, holding that 
although Christiansen might face trouble at summary judgment or proving at trial 
that he was discriminated against because of his failure to live up to gender 
stereotypes and not his sexual orientation, the facts alleged were sufficient to 
withstand a motion to dismiss.[21]  
This case highlights the near impossible task that courts can face in segmenting 
out allegations arising from an employee’s non-conformity to gender stereotypes 
and an employee’s sexual orientation.  In a concurring opinion in Hamm v. 
Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc.,[22] Judge Posner criticized this doctrinal 
development as “absurd:” 
[T]he law protects effeminate men from employment discrimination, but only if they are 
(or are believed to be) heterosexuals. To impute such a distinction to the authors of Title 
VII is to indulge in a most extravagant legal fiction. It is also to saddle the courts with the 
making of distinctions that are beyond the practical capacity of the litigation process. 
Hostility to effeminate men and to homosexual men, or to masculine women and to 
lesbians, will often be indistinguishable as a practical matter, especially the former. 
Effeminate men often are disliked by other men because they are suspected of being 
homosexual (though the opposite is also true–effeminate homosexual men may be 
disliked by heterosexual men because they are effeminate rather than because they are 
homosexual), while mannish women are disliked by some men because they are suspected 
of being lesbians and by other men merely because they are not attractive to those men; 
a further complication is that men are more hostile to male homosexuality than they are 
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to lesbianism. To suppose courts capable of disentangling the motives for disliking the 
nonstereotypical man or woman is a fantasy.[23] 
Judge Posner’s concerns were echoed in a concurring opinion from Chief Judge 
Robert Katzmann in Christiansen. Judge Katzmann wrote that it is an 
“exceptionally difficult task [to disaggregate sexual orientation and gender non-
conformity claims] in light of the degree to which sexual orientation is commingled 
in the minds of many with particular traits associated with gender.”[24]   
A second important decision from the Supreme Court was handed down in 1998. 
In Oncale v. Sundowner Services, the Supreme Court held that same-sex 
harassment was actionable under Title VII, provided the plaintiff could 
demonstrate that the harassing conduct was motivated “because of sex.”[25]  
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia illustrated three scenarios where a plaintiff 
could sustain a same-sex harassment claim. A plaintiff could proffer “credible 
evidence that the harasser was homosexual,” evidence he or she was harassed with 
“sex-specific and derogatory terms . . . motivated by general hostility to the 
presence” of men or women in the workplace, or “comparative evidence about how 
the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.”[26]  
In the aftermath of these decisions, the Equal Opportunity Employment 
Commission issued an agency interpretation of Title VII in 2015 that 
discrimination because of  a person’s  sexual orientation is a form of actionable sex 
discrimination. The EEOC reasoned, “Discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation is premised on sex-based preferences, assumptions, expectations, 
stereotypes, or norms.”[27]  A handful of federal district courts relied on the 
EEOC’s ruling in denying motions to dismiss sexual orientation discrimination 
claims under Title VII.[28] 
These developments notwithstanding, the circuits were consistent and unanimous 
in ruling against Title VII sexual orientation discrimination claims. Until the 
Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of Kimberly Hively in 2017, no circuit deviated from 
the kind of analysis offered in Ulane and its progeny. Every circuit held that sexual 
orientation discrimination claims were not cognizable under Title VII’s existing 
framework.[29]  
III. Hively v. Ivy Tech: Facts and Procedural Posture  
Kimberly Hively began working at Ivy Tech Community College in South Bend, 
Indiana in 2000.[30]  For nine years, Hively’s time teaching math as an adjunct 
teacher at Ivy Tech was seemingly uneventful until she was seen kissing her 
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girlfriend goodbye in an Ivy Tech parking lot.[31]  Hively claimed an Ivy Tech 
administrator reprimanded her the following day for the incident.[32]   
Between 2009 and 2014, Hively unsuccessfully applied for at least six full-time 
positions.[33]  In July 2014, Ivy Tech declined to renew her adjunct teaching 
contract.[34]  Hively believed Ivy Tech refused to hire her for a full-time position 
because of her sexual orientation.[35]  In December 2013, Hively filed a charge 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, stating: 
I have applied for several positions at IVY TECH, fulltime, in the last 5 years. I believe I 
am being blocked from fulltime employment without just cause. I believe I am being 
discriminated against based on my sexual orientation. I believe I have been discriminated 
against and that my rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were violated.[36]  
After receiving a right-to-sue letter, Hively filed a pro se action under Title VII. Ivy 
Tech filed a motion to dismiss, which the court granted citing Seventh Circuit 
precedent that sexual orientation discrimination claims are not cognizable under 
Title VII.[37]  Title VII proscribes discrimination in the workplace because of “race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”[38] However, LGBT civil rights 
organization Lambda Legal, representing Hively on appeal, argued that sexual 
orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination and, thus, gay, lesbian, 
and bisexual workers are protected under the federal civil rights law.  
On appeal, a Seventh Circuit panel affirmed the lower court’s dismissal, citing 
binding circuit precedent that Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination did not 
protect employees against sexual orientation discrimination.[39]  The entire court, 
however, decided to hear Hively’s appeal en banc. 
IV. HIVELY’S COMPETING METHODS OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
An interesting debate over statutory interpretation unfolded among the Seventh 
Circuit’s judges in Hively. The majority and dissent agreed that members of 
Congress’ subjective intent in 1964 was mostly irrelevant. The majority proffered 
that it is “neither here nor there that the Congress that enacted the Civil Rights Act 
. . . may not have realized or understood the full scope of the words it chose. Indeed, 
in the years since 1964, Title VII has been understood to cover far more than the 
simple decision of an employer not to hire a woman for Job A, or a man for Job 
B.”[40] 
Indeed, members of Congress in 1964 may not have foreseen the doctrinal 
developments that would come in the decades after Title VII’s enactment. As the 
majority explained, in the years since Title VII’s enactment, courts interpreted its 
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sex discrimination provision to reach same-sex sexual harassment, sex-based 
actuarial assumptions when calculating pension contribution requirements, and 
sex-stereotypes.[41]  
In dissent, Judge Sykes similarly deemphasized congressional intent, writing 
“[T]he proposed new interpretation is not necessarily incorrect simply because no 
one in the 1964 Congress that adopted Title VII intended or anticipated its 
application to sexual-orientation discrimination.”[42]  The dissent proffered that 
rather than intent, the proper method for interpreting Title VII “is an objective 
inquiry that looks for the meaning the statutory language conveyed to a reasonable 
person at the time of enactment.”[43] Here, Judge Sykes diverged with the 
majority because “sex” and “sexual orientation” had distinct meanings in 1964, and 
today: 
But the analysis must begin with the statutory text; it largely ends there too. Is it even 
remotely plausible that in 1964, when Title VII was adopted, a reasonable person 
competent in the English language would have understood that a law banning 
employment discrimination “because of sex” also banned discrimination because of 
sexual orientation? The answer is no, of course not.[44]  
Perhaps the most interesting (and unusual) take on the method of interpretation 
that prevailed in Hively came from Judge Richard Posner’s concurring opinion, 
which no other member of the court joined. Judge Posner theorized that the court’s 
interpretation of Title VII in Hively was effectively a judicial updating that 
reflected broader changes in society. Judge Posner wrote: 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, now more than half a century old, invites an 
interpretation that will update it to the present, a present that differs markedly from the 
era in which the Act was enacted. But I need to emphasize that this third form of 
interpretation—call it judicial interpretive updating—presupposes a lengthy interval 
between enactment and (re)interpretation. A statute when passed has an understood 
meaning; it takes years, often many years, for a shift in the political and cultural 
environment to change the understanding of the statute.[45]  
As litigation continues to make its way through federal courts calling on judges to 
reconsider older precedent that rejected Title VII sexual orientation claims, it is 
likely these battles over the proper methodology for statutory interpretation will 
continue to take center stage. 
V. SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION AS A FORM OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION 
Contrary to every appellate court to rule on the question as of the date of the 
decision,[46] the en banc court held that Title VII’s sex discrimination protections 
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extend to sexual orientation discrimination. The majority examined three theories 
of sex discrimination to support the its holding: the comparative method, gender 
non-conformity, and associational discrimination. 
A.  The Comparative Method 
In applying the comparative method, the plaintiff’s sex is changed to isolate 
whether an employer making an adverse employment decision took the plaintiff’s 
protected characteristic into consideration. Thus, if an employer mistreats a female 
worker because she has an intimate relationship with another woman, but the 
employer would not mistreat a male employee who  had a substantially similar 
relationship with a woman, the causation of that discrimination is the employee’s 
sex.[47]  In the instant case, Hively argued that if she were a man in a relationship 
with a woman, she would not have been denied a promotion to a full-time position 
or a contract extension.[48]  The Court held that Hively’s argument “describe[d] 
paradigmatic sex discrimination” because if her allegations were true, Ivy Tech 
“disadvantage[ed] her because she is a woman.”[49]   
In a dissenting opinion joined by Judge Joel Flaum and Judge Kenneth Ripple, 
Judge Diane Sykes proffered the majority’s comparative method as flawed because 
it requires altering a plaintiff’s sexual orientation and the plaintiff’s sex while 
holding all other variables constant. Judge Sykes wrote: 
For the comparison to be valid as a test for the role of sex discrimination in this 
employment decision, the proper comparison is to ask how Ivy Tech treated qualified gay 
men. If an employer is willing to hire gay men but not lesbians, then the comparative 
method has exposed an actual case of sex discrimination. If, on the other hand, an 
employer hires only heterosexual men and women and rejects all homosexual applicants, 
then no inference of sex discrimination is possible, though we could perhaps draw an 
inference of sexual-orientation discrimination.[50]  
The majority, however, rejected the Sykes dissent’s logic because, “it makes no 
sense to control for or rule out discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation if 
the question before us is whether that type of discrimination is nothing more or 
less than a form of sex discrimination. Repeating that the two are different, as the 
dissent does at numerous points, also does not advance the analysis.”[51] 
B.  Gender Stereotyping 
Federal courts have long cautioned against viewing homosexuality as an all-
purpose, non-conforming characteristic under Price Waterhouse to impermissibly 
bootstrap sexual orientation discrimination protections into Title VII.[52] 
However, a number of judges have recently rejected those bootstrapping concerns. 
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For example, Chief Judge Katzmann’s concurrence in a recent Second Circuit 
sexual orientation Title VII case, Christiansen v. Omnicom Group. Inc.,[53]  
reasoned “that negative views of sexual orientation are often, if not always, rooted 
in the idea that men should be exclusively attracted to women and women should 
be exclusively attracted to men—as clear a gender stereotype as any.[54]  Judge 
Katzmann’s opinion reflects a view, as expressed by one district court, that sexual 
orientation discrimination is sex discrimination because “homosexuality is the 
ultimate gender non-conformity, the prototypical sex stereotyping animus.”[55]  
The Hively court echoed this line of thinking, reasoning that social expectations 
that men should be sexually attracted to women and women should be sexually 
attracted to men, inform individuals’ bias against gay, lesbian, and bisexual 
persons. As a consequence, sexual orientation discrimination is fundamentally 
indistinguishable from actionable sex discrimination arising from other gendered 
workplace expectations. The court explained:   
Viewed through the lens of the gender non-conformity line of cases, Hively represents the 
ultimate case of failure to conform to the female stereotype (at least as understood in a 
place such as modern America, which views heterosexuality as the norm and other forms 
of sexuality as exceptional): she is not heterosexual. Our panel described the line between 
a gender nonconformity claim and one based on sexual orientation as gossamer-thin; we 
conclude that it does not exist at all. Hively's claim is no different from the claims brought 
by women who were rejected for jobs in traditionally male workplaces, such as fire 
departments, construction, and policing. The employers in those cases were policing the 
boundaries of what jobs or behaviors they found acceptable for a woman (or in some 
cases, for a man).[56] 
Judge Sykes forcefully rejected the majority linking sex-stereotypes with non-
heterosexual sexual orientation.  Indeed, the dissent criticized the majority 
approach as wholesale detached from sex-discrimination all together:  
To put the matter plainly, heterosexuality is not a female stereotype; it is not a male 
stereotype; it is not a sex-specific stereotype at all. An employer who hires only 
heterosexual employees is neither assuming nor insisting that his female and male 
employees match a stereotype specific to their sex. He is instead insisting that his 
employees match the dominant sexual orientation regardless of their sex. Sexual-
orientation discrimination does not classify people according to invidious or idiosyncratic 
male or female stereotypes. It does not spring from a sex-specific bias at all.[57] 
C.  Associational Discrimination 
Finally, the Hively court examined whether an associational theory of 
discrimination could support a sexual orientation discrimination claim under Title 
VII’s existing framework.  Here, the court turned to associational claims in the race 
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context, noting the Eleventh Circuit’s 1988 decision in Parr v. Woodmen of the 
World Life Insurance Company.[58] 
Don Parr, a white man, applied for an insurance salesman position but was not 
hired after the company, which did not employ or sell insurance to African-
Americans, became aware he was in an interracial marriage.[59]  The district court 
granted the company’s motion to dismiss concluding Parr was not discriminated 
against because of his race.[60] The circuit court reversed on appeal, holding, 
“Where a plaintiff claims discrimination based upon an interracial marriage or 
association, he alleges, by definition, that he has been discriminated against 
because of his race.”[61]  The court rejected Woodman’s argument that, because 
Woodman refused to hire blacks, it would have refused to hire any man married to 
an African-American woman regardless of the man’s race.  The court reasoned, 
“Title VII proscribes race-conscious discriminatory practices. It would be folly for 
this court to hold that a plaintiff cannot state a claim under Title VII for 
discrimination based on an interracial marriage because, had the plaintiff been a 
member of the spouse’s race, the plaintiff would still not have been hired.”[62]  
The Hively court reasoned that, like in Parr, if an employer discriminated against 
an employee because he or she was in an interracial relationship, the employer’s 
conduct would be unlawful because the employer took race into account.[63]  
Extending that logic to Hively’s claim, the court reasoned, “If we were to change 
the sex of one partner in a lesbian relationship, the outcome would be different. 
This reveals that the discrimination rests on distinctions drawn according to 
sex.”[64]  As a result, “to the extent that [Title VII] prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of the race of someone with whom the plaintiff associates, it also prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of the national origin, or the color, or the religion, or 
(as relevant here) the sex of the associate. No matter which category is involved, 
the essence of the claim is that the plaintiff would not be suffering the adverse 
action had his or her sex, race, color, national origin, or religion been 
different.”[65]  
 Ultimately, in concluding that sexual orientation discrimination claims are 
actionable under Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination, the Hively court 
reasoned that “[i]t would require considerable calisthenics to remove the ‘sex’ from 
‘sexual orientation’” because “it is actually impossible to discriminate on the basis 
of sexual orientation without discriminating on the basis of sex.”[66] 




Ivy Tech declined to petition the Supreme Court to review the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Hively; meanwhile the issue continues to percolate in federal courts 
throughout the country—in the Third, Eighth, and Fifth circuits— and may reach 
the Supreme Court soon.[67]  Recently, the Second Circuit joined the Seventh 
Circuit in holding Title VII protects employees from sexual orientation 
discrimination in Zarda v. Altitude Express.[68]  Hively is unlikely to dramatically 
shift public employers’ non-discrimination practices given the longstanding, 
express protections in Illinois law against sexual orientation discrimination in 
employment. For employees, however, the decision opens the doors to federal 
court for them to pursue state and federal sexual orientation discrimination claims. 
Despite that little may change in employer policies after the Seventh Circuit’s 
ruling, Hively is a landmark decision that may signal a significant national shift in 
Title VII’s interpretation in favor of gay rights. 
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that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of unlawful sex stereotyping and five judges 
would have adopted the traditional comparator theory.  
 
  
WINTER 2018 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT 19 
 
 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS  
By Student Editorial Board: 
Nicholas Coronado, Yuting Li, Jeremiah Shavers, and Nicolas Ustaski 
I. IELRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Grievance Processing 
In Dave and Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University Carbondale, 34 
PERI ¶ 95 (IELRB 2017), the IELRB held that a complaint should issue over the 
charging party’s allegations that the employer failed to process his grievances in 
retaliation for his protected activity.  
Dave worked for the university as a chemistry professor. The university terminated 
Dave, the union grieved and an arbitrator ruled in Dave’s favor, ordering, in part, 
that Dave be reinstated with back-pay.  
Upon Dave’s return, issues arose over what his reinstatement entailed. The 
university assigned Dave a lab space in his previous building, but it was not his 
original workspace. However, Dave insisted that the award meant that he should 
be returned to his old lab. The university and union asked the arbitrator to clarify 
the award. The arbitrator stated that the award allowed Dave to be assigned a 
similar, although not the same, workspace. Dave continued to complain about not 
being assigned his old lab, claiming that the new workspace was making him ill. 
The university also assigned Dave a workload that did not include a class he had 
previously taught for many years. The new workload also shifted one of Dave’s 
classes to a different semester. Dave filed a grievance on his own behalf to 
challenge the new work assignments. The employer did not respond to the 
grievance. 
The IELRB Executive Director dismissed the charges. The IELRB affirmed as it 
related to the refusal to comply with the arbitration award, and the retaliation for 
union activities claims. The IELRB found that neither of the claims was timely filed 
and that there was insufficient evidence to support a claim of retaliation for union 
activities.  
The IELRB reversed the dismissal of the charge that the university refused to 
process Dave’s grievances. The IELRB had not previously determined whether 
such a refusal could be considered a violation of the IELRA. Section 14(a)(1) of the 
IELRA prohibits educational employers from “[i]nterfering, restraining or 
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed under this Act.”  
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Section 10(c) of the Act requires a grievance procedure in collective bargaining 
agreements. Further, Section 3(b) allows employees to present grievances to their 
employers and to have them adjusted without interference by a bargaining 
representative. In light of this, the IELRB held there was a  facially plausible 
argument that the employer’s refusal to process the grievances could be considered 
an interference or restraint upon Dave’s exercise of his rights granted by section 
14(a)(1). Therefore, the case was remanded to the Executive Director to issue a 
complaint on this issue.   
II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS 
B. Arbitration 
In Teamster Local 700 and Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, 34 
PERI ¶ 136 (ILRB State Panel 2018), the ILRB State Panel held that the Circuit 
Court of Cook County did not violate the IPLRA during a period when the Juvenile 
Temporary Detention Center (JTDC) was  overseen by a Transitional 
Administrator (TA) appointed by a federal court and the TA refused to arbitrate 
discipline and discharge grievances.  
This case began in 2002, when class action plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking redress 
for violations of their constitutional rights due to living conditions and practices at 
the JTDC. The parties entered into a settlement agreement and a Memorandum of 
Agreement (MOA) to ensure the Detention Center housed and cared for the 
residents consistent with constitutional standards. In 2007, a U.S. District Court 
Judge entered an agreed order appointing the TA to bring the JTDC into 
substantial compliance with the MOA and other related orders. The TA also 
received approval from the federal court to suspend certain provisions of the 
collective bargaining agreement. In 2009, the TA refused to arbitrate all grievances 
and any terminations and the union filed unfair labor practice charges against the 
Circuit Court.  
The union argued that the Circuit Court’s refusal to arbitrate grievances, during 
the TA's tenure, constituted a repudiation of the collective bargaining obligation 
because the Circuit Court was a successor in interest to the union's collective 
bargaining agreement. The Circuit Court argued in response, that there was no 
basis on which to impute liability from the TA to the Circuit Court. The TA was not 
a joint employer or agent of the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court did not share the 
TA's power to hire, fire, discipline, promote or demote, only handled the 
arbitrations for a short amount of time, and had no control over the TA’s actions. 
The State Panel concluded that the Circuit Court did not exercise control over 
employees' terms and conditions of employment through the TA's actions because 
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the TA was not an agent of the Circuit Court.  The State Panel dismissed the 
charges. 
C. Managerial Employees 
In AFSCME Council 31 v. Department of Central Management Services (Illinois 
Commerce Commission), 2018 Il. App (1st) 140656, the First District Appellate 
Court held that six directors in the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) were 
managerial employees and properly excluded from an AFSCME-represented 
bargaining unit.  AFSCME Council 31 filed a representation petition which sought 
to include nine directors of the ICC in one of its existing bargaining units. After 
opposition from the ICC, the union stipulated that three of the nine directors 
should be excluded from the unit. The administrative law judge recommended that 
the Board find that three of the directors were managerial employees and the other 
three directors were public employees with full collective bargaining rights. The 
ILRB State Panel  found that all six directors were managerial employees. The 
Appellate Court affirmed. 
The court explained that exclusion of managerial employees is “intended to 
maintain the distinction between management and labor and to provide the 
employer with undivided loyalty from its representatives.” The court used the two-
part test established by Section 3(j) of the IPLRA. To determine if the directors 
were managerial employees, “the person must be both 1) engaged predominately 
in executive and management functions and 2) charged with the responsibility of 
directing the effectuation of management policies and practice.”  
The union argued that the State Panel incorrectly read “predominantly” to mean, 
“superiority in importance or numbers.” The union argued that this qualitative 
interpretation threatened to erase the longstanding practice of quantifying 
“predominately” through assessing whether the employees spent most of their 
time conducting managerial work and tasks. Second, the union argued that the 
Board improperly decided that two of the employees were managerial solely 
because they functioned as informational “gatekeepers.” 
The court concluded that managerial employees “possess and exercise authority 
and discretion which broadly effects a department’s goals and means of achieving 
its goals.” The court further concluded that “predominately” has never been subject 
to a “strict numerical approach” when determining an employee’s managerial 
status. The court stated that “the amount of time an employee spends on 
managerial tasks is not determinative of the employee’s managerial status.”  
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The court agreed with the union’s position that an employee’s functioning as an 
informational gatekeeper does not automatically classify that employee as a 
managerial employee. The employee must also have some decision-making power 
regarding what action should be taken with the information. Merely passing on 
that information to another supervisor was not enough to make the gatekeeper a 
managerial employee. Ultimately, despite the two directors being incorrectly 
classified by the ILRB, the court still found all six directors to be managerial 
employees because of the nature of their tasks. All of the six directors had a mix of 
decision-making power, manners in which to influence the Commissions’ policy 
and objectives, and presenting and implementing recommendations to the 
administration of the Commission. These six directors satisfied the two-part test 
outlined above. 
D. Right to Strike 
In AFSCME Council 31 v. ILRB, 2017 IL App (5th) 160046, 90 N.E.3d 576, the Fifth 
District Appellate Court held that the State of Illinois violated sections 10(a)(1) and 
(2) of the IPLRA when is posted a list of FAQs on its website which advised 
employees that if they struck, they would be charged for the employer’s 
contribution to health insurance premiums in addition to their own contributions 
for any pay period in which they were on strike, regardless of whether they struck 
for the entire pay period.  The ILRB Executive Director had dismissed the union’s 
unfair labor practice charge and the State Panel upheld the dismissal.  The court 
reversed. 
The court determined that the policy would effectively chill and restrain the 
employees from engaging in their statutorily protected right to strike. The State 
argued that the health care benefits policy was akin to a policy that was already in 
place, that employees would not be paid while they were on strike, and that the 
public employer did not have a duty to effectively subsidize a strike.  
However, the court concluded that this no pay during a strike policy was different 
than having employees pay for the health insurance premiums that the public 
employer was responsible for for the entire insurance premium period. This policy 
would cause the employees to pay for the premiums they were responsible for, on 
top of the employer contributions for the entire health insurance period, even if 
the employees were not on strike the entire period. In contrast, the no pay policy 
denied employees pay for the days they were on strike rather than for the entire 
pay period.The court concluded that this policy unlawfully threatened employees 
by making them pay for employer health insurance contributions for the entire 
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insurance assessment period instead of just the days they were on strike. 
Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case to the ILRB.  
 
 
 
 
